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DAMAGES SUITS UNDER ERISA: WHY THIRD
PARTIES WITH DISCRETION OVER BENEFIT
PLANS MUST BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are employed by a small business that offers an
employee health plan. Your employer purchases a group policy from
an outside insurance company to pay claims as they come in. As the
party establishing the plan, your employer is the plan sponsor and the
designated "plan administrator" in the documents you receive.
Although your employer is the named plan administrator, in reality it
is too much work for the owner of a small business to handle all the
claims, decide if they have merit, and actually pay them.
Furthermore, your employer does not have the money, nor does he
deem it necessary to hire someone to handle these matters.
Therefore, he depends on the insurer to handle the bulk of these
functions.
Now consider the following tragic situation: your child gets
very sick and is diagnosed with a debilitating disease. Not only are
you concerned with the child's health and getting the necessary
treatment, but you also find out that the insurance company is
disputing the claim based on your child's previous conditions. You
now have medical bills that are approaching three times your annual
salary and your child needs continued medical services.
You decide to sue the insurance company for payment of
benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), a federal Act that preempts state law governing employee
benefits plans. However, you find out that you cannot sue the
insurance company to recover the cost of your daughter's treatment.
Your only option is to sue your employer because he is defined as
the plan administrator. The problem is, your employer is a small
business that is already close to financial crisis, and besides, it is
your sole source of income.
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How can the insurance company be protected from liability
under a statute that was designed for the very purpose of protecting
people like you? The frightening reality is that under federal law,
this is exactly how many courts would hold. Any action for the
payment of benefits would be barred unless the party sued is
specifically defined in the plan documents as the plan administrator.1
Currently, the federal circuits are split on the issue of who a plan
participant or beneficiary can sue for benefits owed under ERISA
section 502(a)(1)(B).2 The Ninth Circuit most recently faced this
question in Everhart v. Allmerica Financial Life Insurance Co. 3 The
court held de novo that third-party insurers were not proper
defendants in a section 502(a)(1)(B) suit for damages.4 There, the
court interpreted ERISA to mean that a plaintiff may only bring an
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) action against either the plan itself or
the plan administrator. 5 This holding was broader, however, than
previous Ninth Circuit holdings, which held that only the plan as an
entity may be sued for benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B).
The Ninth Circuit is not the only circuit with conflicting
holdings on this issue. Across the circuits some courts have held that
only the plan may be sued,7 while others have held that the plan or
the plan administrator may be sued.8 Still other courts have held that
the plan, the plan administrator, or a party with administrative
1. Courts have also allowed plan participants to bring actions against the
plan as an entity. See Everhart v. Allmerica Fin. Life Ins., 275 F.3d 751, 754
(9th Cir. 2001) (listing the cases that have ruled that the plan as an entity is a
proper defendant in 502(a)(1)(B) actions).
2. See Hall v. LHACO, Inc., 140 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (8th Cir. 1998)
(summarizing the split among the circuits regarding who a proper defendant is
under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)); see also Everhart, 275 F.3d at 754, 758-
59 (discussing the split among the Ninth Circuit as well as the other circuits
regarding who can be sued in a section 502(a)(1)(B) action).
3. See Everhart, 275 F.3d at 751.
4. Id. at 756.
5. Id. at 753-54.
6. "Entity" is used here to mean a suit against the assets of the plan, yet no
one person associated with the plan in his/her individual capacity may be sued.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2) (2002).
7. See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1490 (7th
Cir. 1996); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d Cir. 1993).
8. See Everhart, 275 F.3d at 756; Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246,
1249 (8th Cir. 1998); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1988);
Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 1994).
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discretion are all proper defendants in an ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B) action.9
It is important that these conflicting circuit holdings are resolved
because Congress originally intended that courts would develop a
uniform common law in applying ERISA.10 Congress realized that
too many participants were being treated unfairly by their plans and
employers and that existing law did not adequately deal with these
problems.11 However, given the overall complexity of employee
benefit plans, Congress was also aware that ERISA itself could not
possibly be considered the final word on benefit plan regulation.
Thus, where conflicts arose that were not specifically addressed by
the statute, Congress intended courts to decide these issues with
national uniformity in mind. 
12
Because ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) does not explicitly state
who a potential defendant can be, achieving national uniformity of
the law should be of utmost importance to the courts. Thus, in
examining this issue, certain questions need to be addressed. For
example, is there any consistency among the circuits regarding who a
potential defendant is in an ERISA action for damages? Have the
circuit courts complied with Congress's original intent that a uniform
common law develop in applying ERISA? If so, what is it? If not,
what should it be?
This Note will answer these questions and explain the different
interpretations of the courts that have addressed the question of who
may be sued in an ERISA action for damages. Furthermore, this
Note will demonstrate that, in reaching conflicting holdings, federal
courts have not complied with Congress's original intent that courts
9. See Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187
(11 th Cir. 1997) ("The proper party defendant in an action concerning ERISA
benefits is the party that controls administration of the plan."); Fisher v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding liable a third-party
insurer who was not designated as the "plan administrator" but had
responsibility for actuarial calculations, and the evaluation, approval,
calculation, and payment of employee claims).
10. See Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th
Cir. 1984) (explaining that Congress intended for "[t]he courts.., to formulate
a nationally uniform federal common law to supplement the explicit provisions
and general policies set out in ERISA. ..").
11. See JAY CONISON, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS IN A NUTSHELL 69
(1993).
12. See Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1500.
Summer 2003] 1755
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW [Vol. 36:1753
develop a uniform federal common law in this area of ERISA.
Above all, this Note takes the position that federal courts should
uniformly define the scope of defendants in an ERISA 502(a)(1)(B)
action for damages as any party who has discretionary authority over
the plan and/or its claims.
Expanding the scope of potential defendants to include any party
with discretion over the plan is appropriate for several reasons. One
important factor is that Congress clearly intended that ERISA would
sweep broadly to protect plan participants and their benefit plans.
However, the manner in which the majority of the circuits have
interpreted the section creates a gap in this ERISA protection.
Without the ability to hold a party liable for the very decisions it
makes regarding an individual's benefits, there is left a major
accountability problem when a participant feels he has been treated
wrongly regarding his benefits. This lack of accountability can
potentially lead to mismanagement of benefit plans. 13 As a result,
too many plan participants are left with insufficient benefits when
they might need them most.
To demonstrate the need for the position stated above, this Note
will examine the various circuit holdings and then focus on public
policy reasons for allowing damages suits to be brought against any
party who has discretionary authority over an ERISA plan. Part II
will briefly describe ERISA, focusing on the Congressional intent
behind its creation and development, as well as how this intent
relates to actions brought by plan participants. Part II will also
examine ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) more closely and define certain
terms applicable to the Act. In Part III, this Note will examine
several state and federal circuit decisions, revealing that although
certain common threads can be found among the various holdings, in
reality the holdings are contradictory. Finally, Part IV will
summarize the findings of Part III and weigh them against
Congress's original intent in enacting ERISA and the public policy
surrounding the Act.
13. See infra Part IV. for discussion regarding lack of accountability when




II. BACKGROUND: ERISA AND PLAN PARTICIPANT LAWSUITS UNDER
SECTION 502(A)
A. ERISA Generally
President Gerald Ford signed ERISA in 1974.14 A primary
purpose of the Act was to "safeguard the well-being and security of
working men and women and to apprise them of their rights and
obligations under any employee benefit plan."'15 Determined that
employees should not be left without retirement benefits because of
the actions of plan sponsors, 16 Congress devised a uniform set of
standards, "including rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and
fiduciary responsibility," that all employee benefit plan sponsors
must meet. 17 Rather than limiting the reach of ERISA solely to
retirement plans, however, Congress extended the Act's reach to
employee welfare benefit plans that provide "medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability [or] death.'
18
Congress not only wanted to protect all kinds of employee
benefit plans, but also wanted ERISA to be comprehensive. 19 In
order to accomplish this goal, Congress designed ERISA to preempt
all state law that "related to" an employee health or welfare plan.
20
This expansive preemption clause ensured uniformity in employee
benefit plan regulation throughout the United States.
14. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461 (1994).
15. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
16. The plan sponsor is typically defined as the party that establishes or
maintains the employee benefit plan. See CONISON, supra note 11, at 12.
17. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1021-31, 1101-14 (1976 ed. & Supp. V)).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
19. It should be noted that certain areas do exist that Congress did not
intend for ERISA to cover. One of these limitations is what Congress called
the "saving clause." Essentially, this clause "save[s] state laws governing the
business of insurance from preemption that would otherwise occur by
application" of the preemption clause. Consequently, even if a state regulation
"relates to" an ERISA plan, it is exempt from ERISA preemption if it regulates
insurance. ERISA also expressly exempts from preemption employee benefit
plans maintained "solely" to comply with state worker's compensation,
disability, or unemployment laws, as well as government and church sponsored
plans.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
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Although uniformity is typically the goal when the federal
government passes such an Act, it is recognized that this type of Act
will necessarily be subject to judicial interpretation. Congress
originally intended that courts establish a federal common law to
assist in the enforcement of ERISA. During a Senate subcommittee
hearing, Congress stated that "it is also intended that a body of
Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with
issues involving rights and obligations under the private welfare and
pension plans.",2 1 The courts, however, have thus far failed to follow
Congress's intention.
Beyond providing uniform protection, Congress was also
concerned with establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and
22obligations for fiduciaries of the ERISA plans. Although ERISA
fiduciaries are subject to very stringent standards,a ERISA
recognizes the uniqueness of various plans and allows for this when
subjecting plan fiduciaries to these standards.24 Fiduciaries under
ERISA are defined as the individuals responsible for the operation of
a plan.25 ERISA lists specific examples of fiduciaries such as named
fiduciaries, trustees, investment managers, and plan administrators.26
21. See Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub.
Welfare, 94th Cong., Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 4771 (Comm. Print 1976).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1974) (establishing uniform standards of conduct for
fiduciaries via preemption).
23. See id. §§ 1102-04 (2002).
24. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-.80 (2002), at FR-12 (stating that "[a] plan
may have as few or as many fiduciaries as are necessary for its operation and
administration."); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (providing for a general
definition of "fiduciary" that permits adjustment for the individual
circumstances of each plan).
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
26. See id. § 1102(a)(1) (stating that named fiduciaries are those named in
the plan documents as having "authority to control and manage the operation
and administration of the plan."); see id. § 1103(a) (stating that a trustee is a
person who holds the plan assets and has "authority and discretion to manage
and control" them); see id. § 1002(38) (explaining that an investment manager
is a person, other than the trustee, with "power to manage, acquire or dispose
of" plan assets); see id. § 1002(16)(A) (defining the administrator as the person
responsible for plan administration).
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B. Civil Actions Under ERISA Section 502(a)
One of Congress's main goals in enacting ERISA was to provide
protection to plan participants and their beneficiaries. To achieve
this goal, ERISA provides for "appropriate remedies, sanctions and
ready access to federal courts. 27 ERISA was designed to allow civil
actions to be brought on behalf of plan participants or beneficiaries.28
ERISA section 502(a) authorizes a number of actions that may be
brought by various parties. 29 Under section 502(a)(1)(B), a partici-
pant or beneficiary can sue "to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."
30
A plaintiff may bring suit in either state or federal court under this
section.31  The Supreme Court declared in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Taylor, that section 502(a)(1)(B) directly covers a
suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from a covered plan.32
Furthermore, in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, the Court defined the
type of relief that may be granted under this provision as taking the
form of accrued benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement
to benefits, or an injunction against a plan administrator's improper
refusal to pay benefits.33 Thus, plan participants who seek to recover
benefits due to them under their benefits plan must bring their action
under section 502(a)(1)(B).
In contrast, section 502(a)(3) allows civil actions by a plan
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to "enjoin any act or practice
which violates any provision of [Title I] or the terms of the plan" or
to "obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of [Title I] or the terms of
the plan."34 In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, the Supreme Court
ruled that section 502(a)(3) authorizes the recovery of equitable
relief only and that such relief does not include damages.
3 5
27. Id. § 1001(b).
28. See id. §§ 1138-44.
29. See id. § 1132(a).
30. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
31. See id. § 1132(e)(1).
32. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).
33. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
35. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
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Even a cursory examination of the language of these two 502(a)
sections provides a pretty good understanding as to who can bring an
action under ERISA.36 However, the Act is not clear in determining
against whom the plan participant can bring the action. 37 This lack
of clarity is precisely what has led to the inconsistency among
circuits as to who an appropriate defendant is under section
502(a)(1)(B).
III. WHO IS A PROPER DEFENDANT UNDER ERISA SECTION
502(A)(1)(B)?
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Everhart is the most recent case
to determine who a proper defendant is under ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B). 38  There, the court held that a plan participant or
beneficiary could not sue a third-party insurer to recover benefits
when the insurer is not functioning as the plan administrator.39 In
that case, the plaintiffs husband was an employee of Credence
Systems Corporation, which had established an employee benefit
plan subject to ERISA.4° Credence acted as the plan administrator
and purchased a plan from Allmerica, a third-party insurer.41
According to the plan documents, if a plan participant died, his
beneficiaries were to receive a death benefit of twice his annual
earnings.42
The plaintiffs husband died in a plane crash, and as his
beneficiary, the plaintiff sought twice his yearly salary, including
commissions, which totaled approximately $480,000. 43 Allmerica
sent her a check for only $202,829, a figure that did not include her
husband's commissions." She brought suit against Allmerica for
recovery of benefits, arguing "annual earnings" should include not
only his base salary, but also the commissions he earned.45
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3) (a "participant," "beneficiary,"
"fiduciary").
37. See id.
38. Everhart v. Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2001).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 752.
41. See id.
42. See id.
41 , Po id qt 751
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The majority recognized that a participant could recover benefits
due under the terms of the plan.46 However, upon guidance from
both its own decision in Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp.47 and
precedent from other circuits,48 the court held that a money judgment
for an action brought under section 502(a)(1)(B) could be enforced
only against the plan as an entity or the plan administrator.49 In
doing so, the court actually broadened Gelardi, which held that
damages actions could be brought only against the plan.50 However,
because the plan documents defined the employer as the plan
administrator, not Allmerica, the court held against the plaintiff.
51
Although the Everhart court broadened its previous holding of
Gelardi, it still used Gelardi as precedent against extending possible
liability to third parties.52 In Gelardi, the plaintiff attempted to sue
her employer and the third-party administrator of the plan.53 The
court did not allow the suit against the employer or the third-party
administrator because neither of them had discretionary control over
the disposition of claims. Rather, a separate committee had been
designated by the employer to handle claims.54 The court reasoned
that the "[plaintiff] must sue either the plan or the fiduciary,"
meaning that only the committee could be sued because it was the
only party with discretion over the consideration of claims.
55
46. See id.
47. 761 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1985).
48. See Everhart, 275 F.3d at 754 (The court cites the following cases to
support its proposition: Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469,
1471 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that "[t]he beneficiary of an ERISA plan may
bring a civil action against a plan administrator" to recover benefits under §
1132(a)(1)(B)); Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998)
(permitting suit under § 1132(a)(1)(B) against plan administrator but not
employer); Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187
(1 lth Cir. 1997) ("The proper party defendant in an action concerning ERISA
benefits is the party that controls administration of the plan."); Daniel v. Eaton
Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that an employer is not a
proper defendant in an action for benefits under ERISA unless it is "shown to
control administration of a plan")).
49. See id. at 746.
50. See Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1323.
51. See Everhart, 275 F.3d at 754.
52. Id. at751.
53. See Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324.
54. See id. at 1325.
55. See id.
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Gelardi, however, presents a relatively unusual set of facts.
Pertec, the employer, set up a separate committee as the fiduciary
and there was no third-party insurer involved-Self Insurance was
only hired to perform non-discretionary administrative functions. 56
Therefore, a credible argument can be made that Gelardi did not
create a general rule that actions cannot be brought against third
parties, as the Everhart majority construed it. Instead, as the dissent
argued, Gelardi should be interpreted as ruling that liability should
lie against whichever party has discretionary authority over the plan.
The Everhart dissent took the position that liability should lie
with a third party who has discretion over the plan. It distinguished
Gelardi from Everhart and argued that the majority misread Gelardi
when it stated that "[the plaintiff] must sue either the plan or the
fiduciary." 57 The dissent effectively argued that the majority was
mixing the words of another ERISA section into section
502(a)(1)(B)5 For instance, only in section 502(d)(1) does the Act
state that the plan as an entity may be sued. This language, however,
is missing from section 502(a)(1)(B). 59 That section applies only to
suing the plan, as opposed to reaching past the plan to collect from
individual trustees or others that are somehow associated with the
plan. Moreover, 502(a)(1)(B) does not refer to suits that may be
brought against other parties under ERISA.60 The dissent indicates
that it merely "puts ERISA litigants on notice that to obtain and
enforce a money judgment against any party other than the plan, they
must sue that other party directly." 61
The Everhart dissent went on to argue that, because neither the
employer nor the insurer had discretion over the disposition of
claims, the court's language meant that "given the provisions of the
plan at issue ... the only parties [the plaintiff] could sue were the
parties with the authority or obligation to determine or pay the
benefits-the Plan and the fiduciary., 62 Thus, the dissent concluded,
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 757-58 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1)-(2) (2002).
60. Everhart, 275 F.3d at 757 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 758.
62. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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the court was not establishing a general rule as to whom employees
may sue.
63
Like the Everhart majority, the Seventh and Second Circuits
also relied on Gelardi in reaching a decision as to who a proper
defendant is in section 502(a)(1)(B) actions. 64 Those circuits held
that only the plan as an entity can be sued for benefits and have not
yet extended the realm of possible defendants.
However, like the Ninth Circuit, other circuits have extended
section 502(a)(1)(B) to include actions against both the plan as an
entity as well as the plan administrator. 65 The Third, Sixth, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits have all held that a potential defendant can be
either the plan itself or the plan administrator. 66 However, recall that
the Ninth Circuit in Everhart was unwilling to extend the definition
to a third-party insurer. There, the majority refused to include the
third-party insurer as a defendant even though it had discretionary
authority over the payment of claims. Thus, the problem lies in
exactly how a "plan administrator" is defined.
63. See id.
64. See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1490 (7th
Cir. 1996) (holding that ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) "permits suits to recover
benefits only against the plan as an entity."); Riordan v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 128 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 1997) ("It is true that ERISA permits
suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity."); Lee v. Burkhart,
991 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) only
allows suits against the plan as an entity).
65. See Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246 (8th Cir. 1998) (section
502(a)(1)(B) action permitted against plan administrator but not the employer);
Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the proper defendant in a section 502(a)(1)(B) action is the party
who administers the plan); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding that an employer is only liable in an action for benefits when it is
shown they administered the plan); Hall v. LHACO, Inc., 140 F. 3d 1190 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the proper defendant in an ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B) action is either the plan as an entity or the administrator of the
plan); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433 (3d Cir. 1997)
(entertaining an action against the plan administrator to recover benefits under
section 502(a)(1)(B)); Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226,
233 (3d Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that ERISA allows suits to recover benefits
against the plan as an entity and against the fiduciary of the plan, and finding
that a plan administrator is such a fiduciary).
66. See Layes, 132 F.3d at 1246; Garren, 114 F.3d at 186; Daniel, 839 F.2d
at 263; Hall, 140 F.3d at 1190; Mitchell, 113 f.3d at 433; Curcio, 33 F.3d at
226.
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A closer examination of the meaning of the term "plan
administrator" reveals that third-party insurers (as well as other
parties with discretionary control over the plan) qualify as "plan
administrators" and therefore should be included as defendants in an
action for damages.
A. Third-Party Administrators Should Be Regarded as Plan
Administrators When They Possess Discretionary Authority Over
Benefit Plans
ERISA section 316(A) defines the administrator as the person
who is responsible for plan administration, including record keeping
and overseeing of benefit payments.67  The administrator is
necessarily a fiduciary because it has discretionary authority or
responsibility in the administration of the plan.68 However, courts
have also been careful to indicate that not every person who
performs 6Vlan administrative tasks is an administrator, or even a
fiduciary. Someone who performs purely ministerial functions
relating to reports, record-keeping, benefit payments, and benefit
claims, all "within a framework of policies, interpretations, rules,
practices and procedures made by other persons," is not a fiduciary
because he does not have the requisite discretion in plan
administration.70  Therefore, establishing discretion in plan
administration seems to be a key factor in defining who counts as a
"plan administrator., 71
Because Everhart recognized that plan administrators are valid
defendants in ERISA actions, and administrators are defined as
having discretion in the administration of the plan, it follows that the
court incorrectly held the action could not be brought against the
third-party insurer. The majority in Everhart does not deny that
Allmerica, the third-party insurer, had discretionary authority as to
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (2000).
68. See CONISON, supra note 11, at 12.
69. See id. at 12-13.
70. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-.80, at D-2 (2002) (N.D. Ga. 1986).
71. See e.g., Chambers v. Kaleidoscope, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 359, 376 (1986)
(holding that a defendant was not a fiduciary of the plan because the plan




whether benefits are paid or owed.72 They dismiss that authority,
however, by stating that this discretion makes the third-party insurer
a fiduciary, not an administrator.73 On the other hand, Gelardi, the
very precedent on which the Everhart majority relied, affirmed that
"Gelardi must sue either the Plan or the fiduciary and [the employer
nor the insurer] were neither." 74 The apparent inconsistency is that
Everhart called Allmerica a fiduciary yet based its holding (that
Allmerica is not a proper defendant) on precedent that states that a
fiduciary is a proper defendant. 75 However, this is not to say that an
action for breach of fiduciary duty can always be brought under
section 502(a)(1)(B). Rather, one may argue that when a third-party
insurer has discretion in payment of benefits, even though not
considered the "plan administrator," an action should be allowed
against the third-party insurer to collect these benefits.76
The Everhart majority was also arguably faulty in using Gibson
v. Prudential Insurance Co. ofnAmerica 77 as precedent to support its
holding. Gibson held an insurance company could not be sued to
recover benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B). 78 However, Gibson can
be distinguished because the insurance company merely served as
the plan's claims-handling agent and did not have discretionary
control over the benefits plan.
Holdings in other circuits also provide support for the premise
that the definition of "plan administrator," and hence liability, should
be extended to parties beyond merely the stated "plan administrator"
and the plan as an entity. These circuits recognize a distinction
between parties who perform mere administrative functions and
those that have discretion over administrative functions.
72. See Everhart v. Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 751, 754 (9th Cir.
2001).
73. See id.
74. Gelardi v. Pertec, Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1324 (9th Cir.
1985).
75. It may be that the Everhart majority took the Gelardi statement that
"Gelardi must sue either the Plan or the fiduciary" to mean that only the plan
can be sued to recover benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B), and a fiduciary is only a
proper defendant under § 502(a)(3) for equitable relief. However, the language
of these provisions neither excludes nor limits the scope of defendants.
76. See Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding that actions
for breach of fiduciary belong under § 502(a)(3) as opposed to § 502(a)(1)(B)).
77. Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 915 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1990).
78. See id.
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For instance, in Hall v. LHACO, Inc.,7 9 the Eighth Circuit
analyzed the meaning of "plan administrator" in determining whether
it was proper to bring a section 502(a)(1)(B) action against the
defendant. 80 The court looked at whether the defendant, a third-party
administrator of the employment benefit plan, had discretion in
administrative functions, as opposed to a party merely engaging in
administrative services. The court viewed this distinction as being a
material factor in determining whether or not the party was a proper
defendant.
8 1
The Hall court defined "administrator" as: "(i) the person
specifically designated as the administrator by the terms of the plan
[documents]; (ii) if the [plan documents do] not designate an
administrator, the plan sponsor; or (iii) if no administrator is
designated and a plan sponsor cannot be identified, a person
prescribed by the Secretary in regulations."82  The court also
recognized that a circuit split existed as to whether a party other than
the one designated in the plan documents could be a "de facto"
administrator of the plan.83 The court noted that "[t]he First Circuit,
and possibly the Fifth and Eleventh, are willing to deem
nonadministrators 'de facto' plan administrators; the other circuits
(except the Third and Eighth, which have not been heard from on
this issue) are not."
84
Although the Hall court avoided making a decision on the
question of whether a party other than the one designated in ERISA
plan documents can be sued under section 502(a)(1)(B) as a "de
facto" plan administrator, the First Circuit held that it can be. In
making this decision, the First Circuit in Law v. Ernst & Young
5
stated that it is:
consistent with the intent of Congress that employees have
a remedy when they are denied timely information about
their ERISA benefits. To hold that an entity not named as
administrator in the plan documents may not be held liable
79. 140 F.3d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir. 1998).
80. See id. at 1195.
81. See id. at 1191, 1194.
82. Id. at 1195 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)).
83. See id. (citing Jones v. UOP, 16 F.3d 141, 145 (7th Cir. 1994)).
84. Id.
85. 956 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1992).
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under § 1132(c), 86 even though it actually controls the
dissemination of plan information, would cut off the
remedy Congress intended to create.8
7
The Eleventh Circuit followed Law and held that when a
company is administering the plan, it can be held liable for benefits
under ERISA regardless of who the plan documents define as the
"plan administrator."88 The reasoning of these courts, and others, is
that when a party has discretion and a certain amount of control over
claims arising from the benefits plan, it should be liable under
ERISA as if it were the plan administrator. 89
Thus, there is overwhelming support that the Everhart court
should have treated the third-party insurer as if it were a plan
administrator in deciding whether an action for damages could be
brought against it. The third-party insurer there "was responsible for
evaluating and determining the merits of claims filed by the plan's
participants and beneficiaries. It controlled the administration of the
plan and made the discretionary decisions as to whether benefits
were owed."90 Following both the definition of plan administrator,
under ERISA section 316(A), and the recognition of parties with
discretionary authority over the plan as "de facto" administrators
from Hall and the line of cases it followed, it is apparent that an
action should have been allowed against the third-party insurer in
Everhart.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (c)(1) provides:
Any administrator... who fails or refuses to comply with a request
for any information which such administrator is required.., to furnish
to a participant or beneficiary... by mailing the material requested
within 30 days after such request may in the court's discretion be
personally liable to such participant or beneficiary in the amount of up
to $100 a day ....
29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) (2000). Although the court made its decision regarding
§ 502(c) of ERISA, similar reasoning should be utilized with § 502(a)(1)(B)
actions since both relate to § 502(a) civil actions by plan participants.
87. Law, 956 F.2d at 373.
88. See Rosen v. TRW, Inc., 979 F.2d 191, 192 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
89. See e.g., Fisher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 1073
(5th Cir. 1990) (holding liable a third-party insurer, who was not designated as
the "plan administrator," but had responsibility for actuarial calculations, and
the evaluation, approval, calculation, and payment of employee claims).
90. Everhart v. Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 751, 759 (9th Cir.
2001).
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B. The Language of ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) Does Not Limit
Potential Defendants to Plans and Plan Administrators
When deciding who a plan participant or beneficiary may sue
for damages under ERISA, the most logical place to look for
guidance is the statute itself. However, the language of section
502(a)(1)(B) in no way excludes or limits the potential scope of
defendants that a plan participant can sue.9' Where the statute does
not address the question, it is likely an issue that Congress intended a
consistent common law interpretation developed through the courts,
to emerge and provide guidance.
In Harris Trust v. Salomon Smith Barney,92 the United States
Supreme Court was faced with interpreting a similar statutory
omission in ERISA section 502(a)(3).93 The Court recognized that
section 502(a)(3) "admits of no limit.., on the universe of possible
defendants." 94 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that "[o]ther
provisions of ERISA, by contrast, [do] expressly address who may
be a [proper] defendant." The Court went on to state that "section
502(a) itself demonstrates Congress's care in delineating the universe
of [proper] plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions. 95
Although, the Court warned "ERISA's 'comprehensive and
reticulated' scheme warrants a cautious approach to inferring
remedies not expressly authorized by the text, 96 it concluded that
"defendant status under section 502(a)(3) may arise from duties
imposed by [the section] itself, and hence does not turn on whether
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
92. 530 U.S. 238 (2000).
93. Section 502(a)(3) states: "(a) A civil action may be brought--(3) by a
participant.. . (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates this title or the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan."
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
94. Harris, 530 U.S. at 246.
95. Id. (As examples, the court cites § 409(a) (stating that "[a]ny person
who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries... shall be
personally liable"); section 502(1) (authorizing imposition of civil penalties
against a "fiduciary" who violates part 4 of Title I or "any other person" who
knowingly participates in such a violation).
96. Harris, 530 U.S. at 247 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 146 (1985)).
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the defendant is expressly subject to a duty under one of ERISA's
substantive provisions."
97
Because the Supreme Court in Harris authorized a suit for
injunction against a fiduciary under section 502(a)(3), the same
reasoning should apply to a damages suit under section 502(a)(1)(B);
the only difference is the type of remedy sought. This is particularly
true where the third party had discretionary authority over the plan.
Because other ERISA sections do specifically place limits upon who
a plan participant can sue, courts should follow the approach the
United States Supreme Court took when the statute is silent.
The United States Supreme Court case Mertens lends further
support for the view that section 502(a)(1)(B) provides for actions
against parties with discretion over the plan. 98 There, the Court was
divided five to four on whether equitable relief under section
502(a)(3) included monetary damages. 99 The Court focused on the
well-accepted view that ERISA analysis is based on the common law
of trusts.' 00 The Court reasoned that because ERISA's analysis
derives from the common law of trusts, equitable relief should be
understood to refer to remedies available in equity for breach of trust,
including monetary damages.101 The dissent argued that under trust
law, a non-fiduciary was liable for knowing participation in a breach
of trust. Therefore, a non-fiduciary ought to be liable for similar
conduct under ERISA as well. 10 2  The majority, although
acknowledging that damages were available in equity for breach of
trust, found that equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) should be
limited to injunction and restitution.'
0 3
The importance of Mertens is not the holding itself-it is
accepted that section 502(a)(3) only provides for equitable relief, not
97. Id.
98. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
99. See id. at 266-67.
100. See id. at 255-56; see e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1995);
see also 2 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Subcommittee on Labor
of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by the Library of Congress),
Ser. No. 93-406, pp. 2350-52, 2358-60 (1976).
101. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 264, 267 (White, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 266 (White, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 256.
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damages. 1' 4 However, the reasoning the Court used to reach its
holding is very important in determining whether all parties with
discretionary authority should be liable for damages under section
502(1)(1)(B).
Although the case involved a breach of fiduciary duty under
section 502(a)(3), the Court looked to ERISA's roots in trust law in
reaching its decision.1 0 5 The Court recognized that at common law,
courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over actions by
beneficiaries for breach of trust and that money damages were
available in those courts against the trustee. 0 6 The Court based its
holding, however, on the specific language of section 502(a)(3)
which limits the relief to "equitable relief."' 0 7 The Court interpreted
the wording of that section to mean that Congress intended relief
under section 502(a)(3) to be only the traditional forms of equitable
relief-for example, an injunction or restitution.10 8
The fact that the Supreme Court recognized that ERISA was
rooted in trust law and looked to it in interpreting the section in
question is evidence that, in the absence of specific statutory
language, courts should look to trust law in interpreting ERISA
where Congress has not provided explicit guidance.'0 9 In other
words, if ERISA's roots are in trust law, and in trust law even a non-
fiduciary can be held liable for damages, it follows that a party with
discretionary authority over a plan and who is a fiduciary should be
liable for damages under section 502(a)(1)(B).
In sum, given the Supreme Court's analysis in Harris regarding
the precise wording of ERISA in deciding who can be sued, relative
to the imprecise wording of section 502(a)(1)(B), courts should be
cautious when reading limits into the statute that do not explicitly
104. See e.g, Great West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204
(2002) (finding that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under ERISA §
502(a)(3) because the relief they sought was for damages, not equitable relief).
105. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255-56; see also Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 497
(recognizing that trust law may provide a "starting point" for analysis of
ERISA where it is not inconsistent with "the language of the statute, its
structure, or its purposes.").
106. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
107. Id. at 257.
108. See id.
109. The Supreme Court in fact stated this proposition in Varity
Corp., 516 U.S. at 496.
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exist. It is simply unfair to deny a person the ability to sue, for
benefits, the very entity that is responsible for paying those benefits
in the first place.
IV. PARTIES WITH DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY OVER EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PLANS NEED TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE UNDER
SECTION 502(A)(1)(B) IN ORDER To BEST SERVE
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND PUBLIC POLICY
This Note has shown that precedent allows section 502(a)(1)(B)
liability against parties other than the stated plan administrator
and/or the plan as an entity. It has further shown that the wording of
the statute does not limit liability to those two potential defendants.
Throughout the discussion of the factors of precedent and statutory
language, this Note has established that Congress intended for courts
to develop a universal common law with regard to ERISA.
However, simply creating a common law is not enough. The
common law that results must correspond with Congress's original
policy objectives for creating ERISA.
A. It is Imperative That Courts Conform to Congress's Original
Intent and Create a Universal ERISA Common Law
When Congress passed ERISA in 1974, there was much concern
about the abuse and mismanagement of pension and employee
benefit plans.' 10 With this is mind, one of Congress's primary
reasons for enacting ERISA was to ensure that employees received
the pensions and other benefits which they were entitled to under
their benefit plans. 1' To enforce this principle, Congress mandated
that the courts develop a "federal common law of rights and
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."'1 2  Furthermore, the
federal common law applicable to ERISA was to be formulated
110. See Shelley L. Ward, Note, Enlarging an Employer's Fiduciary Hat:
Varity Corp. v. Howe Increases Employers' Exposure to Liability When They
Act as ERISA Fiduciaries, 34 Hous. L. REv. 1195, 1199 n.23 (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 93-807 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4676-77).
111. See Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation, 1973: Hearings on H.R. 2
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 93d Cong.
1 (1973) (statement of Rep. Dent, Chairman of subcommittee).
112. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
Summer 2003] 1771
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 36:1753
based on the "federal policies at issue."'1 13 Therefore, the intention
was to create a uniform federal law that would favor plan
participants' rights to their employment benefits, specifically
employees' rights "against employers, insurers and administrators of
employee benefit plans." 114
However, circuit courts have not complied with Congress's
intent in two ways: (1) the circuit courts have been inconsistent in
their holdings, thereby failing to create a uniform federal law; and (2)
in failing to establish uniform law, the circuit courts are inconsistent
in carrying out Congress's goal to protect plan participants against
those with discretionary control over their plans.
Adopting a uniform law that plan participants should be able to
sue for damages those parties who have discretionary control over
their benefit plans would enhance the system by making potential
lawsuits against parties with discretion over plans more predictable.
Congress wanted to eliminate the possibility that the law governing
employment benefits would differ from state to state.1 5
Additionally, Congress wanted to "help administrators, fiduciaries
and participants to predict the legality of proposed actions without
the necessity of reference to varying state laws."' 16
Congress was concerned that dissimilar state laws regarding
employee benefit plans would result in less effective protection of
those plans. The United States Supreme Court also expressed that
fear in FMC Corp. v. Holliday.117 There, the Court stated its concern
that requiring "plan providers to design their programs in an
environment of differing state regulations would complicate the
administration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that
employers might offset with decreased benefits.""' 8  The Court
further articulated in Shaw v. Delta Airlines 19 that the costs of
113. Menhom v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir.
1984).
114. Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949, 958 (9th Cir. 1998).
115. See 120 CONG. REC. 29942 (1974).
116. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4650.
117. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
118. Id. at 60 (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504,
523-26 (1981)).
119. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
1772
DISCRETIONARY A UTHORITY
tailoring plans to the different laws of various states might cause the
employer to reduce benefits.
120
A uniform common law in this area of ERISA would, in
addition, eliminate the need for businesses and insurers to transact
differently in one state than another. For example, third-party
insurers might be tempted to favor doing business in one region of
the country over another or to grant benefits according to different
criteria in one state versus others. It is likely that employment
benefit discrepancies would potentially cause variations in the
administrative and accounting practices of multistate plans, leading
to extensive inefficiencies. For example, plan participants would
ultimately bear the costs in choice-of-law litigation. Finally, as
multistate plans attempt to defend themselves against liability in
"favorable jurisdictions," opportunistic forum shopping situations
would likely arise.
B. Public Policy Compels a Uniform ERISA Common Law that
Allows Damages Suits Against All Parties with Discretionary
Authority Over Employment Benefit Plans
Not only is it imperative that courts develop a uniform ERISA
common law, but in addition, they must create a common law that
expands liability to all parties with discretion over employee benefit
plans. Such a common law is justified by Congress's original public
policy objectives.
It was precisely public policy reasons that prompted Congress to
initially enact ERISA. Congress stated its reason for establishing
ERISA as follows:
One of the most important matters of public policy facing
the nation today is how to assure that individuals who have
spent their careers in useful and socially productive work
will have adequate incomes to meet their needs when they
retire. This legislation is concerned with improving the
fairness and effectiveness of qualified retirement plans in
their vital role of providing retirement income. 1
21
120. See id. at 105 n.25.
121. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4670, 4676.
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When courts interpret statutes such as section 502(a)(1)(B) they
should give weight to Congress's expressed intent and keep policy
objectives in mind. By holding parties with discretion over
employee benefit plans fully accountable for their decisions, courts
would protect the plans and increase the overall efficiency of the
employment benefit plan system.
The protection of employment benefits was clearly a principle
factor for establishing ERISA in 1974. With the sheer growth of
employment benefit plans since ERISA's enactment, the importance
of meeting the policy objective of protecting employment benefits
has become even more substantial. In 1974, when ERISA was
enacted, private pension plan assets amounted to $164 billion.
122
Today total pension assets amount to more than $4 trillion.
123
Moreover, these figures do not even include the assets involved in
medical insurance, life insurance, and other welfare plans.
124
Clearly, because ERISA covers nearly all private sector
employees, 125 the potential impact upon individual employees and
society as a whole is immense.
Indeed, it was precisely because of the potential harm to society
that Congress recognized the need for broad participant relief
through ERISA. Congress recognized that:
the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit
plans.., has been rapid and substantial; that the operational
scope and economic impact of such plans is increasingly
interstate; that the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are directly
122. See Michael S. Sirkin, Symposium: The 20th Anniversary of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (1974-1944): The 20 Year History
of ERISA, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 321, 322 n.3 (1994) (citing H.R. REP. No.
533, at 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641) (estimating that
in 1974 assets of private pension plans totaled over 150 billion dollars).
123. See Private Pension Plan Assets Reached $4.02 Trillion In 1998,
According To PWBA Report (June 19, 2002), at http://www.spencernet.com/
Archive/News06l9O2.html#Anchor-49575 (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
124. See id.
125. See Mark T. McDermott, It's The Law: Health Insurance For Adopted
Children, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES (Mar.-Apr. 2002) at https://
www.adoptivefamilies.com//pdf/health ins.pdf (stating that "ERISA covers
almost all employers except government employers").
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affected by these plans; [and] that they are affected with a
national public interest. 12
6
Allowing plan participants the opportunity to hold accountable
those parties with discretion over their benefit plans is a key
component in safeguarding Congress's stated policies. It makes no
sense for courts to allow plan participants to bring actions against
parties who did not make decisions regarding their benefits while
forbidding actions against the party who did. The health insurance
industry serves as an example. In 2001, national health care
expenditures totaled nearly 1.5 trillion dollars. 127 More than fifty
percent of that total came from private sources-mainly
contributions to employee benefit plans covered by ERISA. 128 Over
the years, third-party insurer systems developed to assist patients
with rising medical costs. When the individual has medical needs a
third-party insurer typically pays for the treatment. Currently, nearly
all consumer health care expenditures are paid for through some type
of third-party insurer; only about twenty-nine percent is paid through
direct out-of-pocket payments. 12
9
Third-party insurers will typically utilize some sort of review
process to evaluate the necessity of treatment. 130 These third-party
insurers-through a review of the validity or the necessity of a
patient's claim-frequently make decisions regarding employees'
benefit plans determining what is or is not covered. Such insurers
need to be held accountable when they are in a discretionary position
over an individual's benefit plan. Again, it does not make sense for a
court to allow plan participants to bring actions under ERISA section
126. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994) (stating policy reasons for enactment of
ERISA).
127. See Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Table 3: National
Health Expenditures, By Source of Funds and Type of Expenditure: Selected
Calendar Years 1996 - 2001, at http://cms.hhs.gov/statistics/
nhe/historical/t3.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2003).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Theodore R. Marmor & Michael S. Barr, Making Sense of the
National Health Insurance Reform Debate, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 228,
232 (1992) ("[P]rivate insurance firms spend large and increasing sums on
utilization reviews, marketing, and billing.").
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502(a)(1)(B) against the employer or another party but not against
the party who actually made the decision regarding their plan.
Third-party insurers, as well as any other party with discretion
over benefit plans, will always have an incentive to minimize costs
through review procedures. There is admittedly nothing wrong with
taking cost-saving measures. However, if third-party insurers are not
held liable for damages, they will have less incentive to use utmost
care in their decision-making capacity than they otherwise would
have.
V. CONCLUSION
One of Congress's primary goals in establishing ERISA was to
protect employee benefit plan participants from those in charge of
their plans. The manner in which the circuit courts have interpreted
section 502(a)(1)(B) has left a gap in this intended protection that
needs to be filled. When a party has a discretionary role in the
administration of an employee benefit plan, there is no reason it
should not be liable for damages if a plan participant or beneficiary
pursues a suit against it.
Although ERISA itself is relatively new, every U.S. circuit court
has decided who a proper defendant is under section 502(a)(1)(B).
Unfortunately, the circuits have not complied with Congress's
original intent that a uniform common law should be developed in
this area of the law. Today, not only are the circuits split on this
issue, but many intra-circuit splits exist as well. Because there is no
uniformity as to who is a proper defendant under section
502(a)(1)(B), it is impossible to know exactly who to hold
accountable, and it is very difficult to predict how courts will rule on
this issue.
A uniform law should be promulgated placing liability for
damages on any party who has discretionary control over an
employee benefit plan. Doing so would comply with Congress's
original intention of broad protection over plan participants and their
benefit plans against those in control of their plans. A good deal of
precedent already exists in some of the circuits that apply this rule.
Additionally, it would further important public policy objectives by
placing accountability on all parties that actually make decisions
regarding employee benefit plans. Meeting this objective would
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increase the overall efficiency of the manner in which benefit plans
are run and granted to the plan participants.
Employee benefits programs have greatly increased in size and
importance since ERISA was first enacted in 1974. This trend will
likely increase as pension plans grow and more benefits are offered
to employees. The importance of safeguarding employees' benefits
have been front page news over the past couple years as employee
pension plans within major corporations have dwindled in assets
because of actions of individuals with fiduciary discretion over these
plans.1 3 ' These scenarios should serve as examples of what can
happen when parties with discretionary authority over benefit plans
are not held accountable. As employee benefit plans become
increasingly important to the well-being of the individuals in our
society, our courts must allow employees the ability to protect
themselves to the fullest extent possible.
John M. Teske*
131. See Susan A. Davis, We Must Safeguard Employee Pensions, Feb. 7,
2002, available at http://www.house.gov/susandavis/editorials/ed20702Emp
loyeePensions.html (discussing need for increased protection of employee
benefit plans and offering the Enron bankruptcy as one example of a situation
where those parties with fiduciary duties over the plan need to be held
accountable in order to accomplish the desired protection).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Loyola Law School. I would like to dedicate
this Note to my wife, Jennifer, for all her love and support. I am also grateful
to the entire Editorial Board and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
for their advice and assistance.
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